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For the one-sided hypothesis testing problem it is shown 
that it is possible to reconcile Bayesian evidence against H0 , 
expressed in terms of the posterior probability that H0 is true, 
with frequentist evidence against H0 , expressed in terms of the 
p-value. In fact, for many classes of prior distributions it is 
shown that the infimum of the Bayesian posterior probability of 
H0 is equal to the p-value; in other cases the infimum is less 
than the p-value. The results are in contrast to recent work of 
Berger and Sellke (1985) in the two-sided (point null) case, 
where it was found that the p-value is much smaller than the 
Bayesian infimum. Some comments on the point null problem are 
also given. 
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: Posterior probability; p-value; Prior 
distribution. 
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1. IRTR.ODUCTIOIJ 
In the problem of hypothesis testing, 'evidence' can be thought of as 
a post-experimental (data-based) evaluation of the tenability of the null 
hypothesis, H0 • To a Bayesian, evidence takes the form of the posterior 
probability that H0 is true, while to a frequentist, evidence takes the 
form of the p-value, or the observed level of significance of the result. 
If the null hypothesis consists of a single point, it has long been known 
that these two measures of evidence can greatly differ. The famous paper 
of Lindley (1957) illustrates the possible discrepancy in the normal case. 
The question of reconciling these two measures of evidence has been 
treated in the literature. For the most part, the two-sided (point null) 
problem has been treated, and the major conclusion has been that the 
p-value tends to overstate the evidence against H0 (that is, the p-value 
tends to be smaller than a Bayesian posterior probability). Many refer-
ences can be found in Shafer (1982). However, Pratt (1965) does state that 
in the one-sided testing problem the p-value can be approximately equal to 
the posterior probability of H0 . 
A slightly different approach to the problem of reconciling evidence 
is taken by DeGroot (1973). Working in a fairly general setting, DeGroot 
constructs alternative distributions and finds improper priors for which 
the p-value and posterior probability match. DeGroot assumes that the 
alternative distributions are stochastically ordered which, although he 
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does not explicitly state it~ essentially puts him in the one-sided testing 
problem. 
Dickey (1977), in the two-sided problem, considers classes of priors, 
and examines the infimum of the "Bayes factor," which is closely related 
to the posterior probability of H0 • He also concludes that the p-value 
overstates the evidence against H0 , even when compared to the infimum of 
Bayesian measures of evidence. 
A recent paper by J. Berger and T. Sellke (1985) has approached the 
problem of reconciling evidence in a manner similar to Dickey's approach. 
For the Bayesian measure of evidence they consider the infimum, over a 
class of priors, of the posterior probability that H0 is true. For many 
classes of prior it turns out that this infimum is much greater than the 
frequentist p-value~ leading Berger and Sellke to conclude that"··· 
significance levels can be highly misleading measures of the evidence 
provided by the data against the null hypothesis." 
Although their arguments are compelling, and may lead one to question 
the worth of p-values, their analyses are restricted to the problem of 
testing a point null hypothesis. Before dismissing p-values as measures of 
evidence, we feel that their behavior should be examined in other hypothe-
sis testing situations. 
The testing of a point null hypothesis is one of the most misused 
statistical procedures. In particular, in the location parameter problem, 
the point null hypothesis is more the mathematical convenience rather than 
the statistical method of choice. Few experimenters, of whom we are aware, 
want to conclude "there is a difference." Rather, they are looking to 
conclude "the new treatment is better." Thus there is a direction of 
interest in many experiments, and saddling an experimenter with a two-sided 
test would not be appropriate. 
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In this paper we consider the problem of reconciling evidence in the 
one-sided testing problem. We find, in contrast to the results of Berger 
and Sellke, that evidence can be reconciled. For classes of reasonable, 
impartial priors, we obtain equality between the infimum of the Bayes 
posterior probability that H0 is true and the frequentist p-value. In 
other cases this Bayesian infimum is shown to be a strict lower bound on 
the p-value. Thus, the p-value may be on the boundary or within the range 
of Bayesian evidence measures. 
In Section 2 we present some necessary preliminaries, including the 
classes of priors we are considering and how they relate to those con-
sidered in the two-sided problem. Section 3 contains the main results 
concerning the relationship between Bayesian and frequentist evidence, and 
Section 4 contains comments, in particular about the case of testing a 
point null hypothesis. 
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2. PRELIMIIIARIES 
We consider testing the hypotheses 
vs. (2.1) 
based on observing X=x, where X has location density f(x-a). Throughout 
this paper we will often assume that 
i) f(·) is symmetric about zero 
ii) f(x-a) has monotone likelihood ratio (mlr) 
but we will explicitly state these assumptions whenever used. Recall that 
ii) implies that f(•) is unimodal (Barlow and Proschan, 1975, p. 76). 
If X=x is observed, a frequentist measure of evidence against H0 is 
given by the p-value 
01) 
p(x) • P(X ~ xJS•O) = f f(t)dt 
X 
(2.2) 
A Bayesian measure of evidence, given a prior distribution ~(8), is the 
probability that H0 is true given X•x, 
0 J f(x-9)d~( a) 
P(H0 Jx) • P(a~OJx) = 
-01) ( 2. 3) 
01) J f(x-a)d~(a) 
-01) 
Our major point of concern is whether these two measures of evidence 
can be reconciled, that is, can the p-value, in some sense, be regarded as 
a Bayesian measure of evidence. Since the p-value is based on the objec-
tive frequentist model, it seems that if reconciliation is possible, we 
must consider impartial prior distributions. By impartial we mean that the 
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prior distribution gives equal weight to both the null and alternative 
hypotheses. 
Four reasonable classes of distributions are given by 
rA = {all distributions giving mass t to each of ( -G),O] and ( 0 , a1) } 
rs = {all distributions symmetric about zero} (2.4) 
rus = {all distributions with unimodal densities, symmetric about zero} 
fNOR = {all normal (O,'t 2 ) distributions, O~'t 2 <a1} 
As our Bayesian measure of evidence we consider inf P(H0 1x), where the 
infimum is taken over a chosen class of priors. We then examine the 
relationship between this infimum and p(x), and see if there is agreement. 
If so, then we have obtained a reconciliation of Bayesian and frequentist 
measures of evidence. 
This development is, of course, similar to that of Berger and Sellke 
(I985), who consider the two-sided hypothesis test H0 : a•O vs. HI: a~O. 
They use priors that give probability ~O and I-~0 to H0 and HI' respective-
ly, and spread the mass over HI according to a density g(8), allowing g(·) 
to vary within a class of distributions similar to the classes in (2.4). 
For any numerical calculations they choose ~0 = t, asserting that this 
provides an impartial prior distribution. We will discuss this choice in 
Section 4. 
For testing H0 : a ~ 0 vs. HI: a > 0, we will mainly be concerned with 
evidence based on observing x > 0. If f is symmetric with mlr, then for x 
< 0, p(x) > t and inf P(H0 1x) • t, where the infimum is over any class in 
(2.4) except rA. Thus, for x < 0, neither a frequentist nor a Bayesian 
would consider the data as giving evidence against H0 • 
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3. COMPAitiliG MEASURES OF EVIDEIICE 
In this section we consider prior distributions contained in the 
classes given in (2.4), and various types of sampling densities. We 
compare inf P(H0 1x) with p(x) under different assumptions and find many 
situations in which inf P(H0 1x) $ p(x). For the classes fUS and fNOR' as 
well as some others, we show that inf P(H0 1x) = p(x) if f is symmetric and 
has mlr. 
We begin with a computational lemma that will facilitate many subse-
quent calculations. The essence of the lemma is that inf P(H0 1x) is the 
same whether we take the infimum over a given class of priors, or over the 
class of all mixtures of members of the class. Since many interesting 
classes can be expressed as mixtures of simpler distributions, this lemma 
will prove to be extremely helpful. 
Lemma 3.1: Let f = {~ : aeA} be a class of prior distributions on 
a 
the real line indexed by the set A. Let fM be the set of all mixtures of 
elements of r, that is, 
~ e rM H ~(B) K f ~a(B)dP(a) 
A 
for some probability measure P on A and all measurable B. Then 
Proof: We use the notation P~(H0 1x) to indicate that ~ is the prior 
used in calculating a posterior probability. 
Consider the random triple (A,9,X) with joint distribution defined by: 
The distribution of Xl9=a has density f(x-e), the distribution of 9IA•a is 
wa, and the distribution of a is P. Then for any ~ e fM, 
-7-
P (H0 1x) = P (e~OIX=x) 
'If 'JI' 
= EA[P(9~0IA=a,X=x)IX=x] 
= EA [P'JI'(e~OIX=x)IX=x] 
a 
• in£ P (e~OIX=x) 
aEA 'Ira 
= in£ P(H0 1x) 
1r er 
a 
The opposite inequality is true since r c rM, and (3.1) is established. D 
We note that this theorem can be proved in greater generality than is 
done here but, as stated, it will serve our purposes. 
By using Lemma 3.1 we can obtain conditions under which p(x) is an 
upper bound on inf P(H0 1x) for the class r 5 through consideration of a 
smaller class contained in rs, 
r2PS = {all two-point distributions symmetric about 0} 
since r5 is the class of all mixtures of distributions in r 2PS' 
Theorem 3.1.: For the hypotheses in (2.1), iff is symmetric and has 
mlr and if x>O, then 
(3.2) 
Proof: The equality in (3.2) follows from Lemma 3.1. For the 
'JI' E fZPS that gives probability t to the two points 9 = ±k we have 
f(x+k) 
P(Holx) = f(x-k)+f(x+k) 
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The assumptions on f imply that, for x>O, P(H0 1x) is decreasing in k and 
hence 
i f ( I ) • i f(x+k) 'i ~----::1~~ 
n P Ho x = k~  f(x-k)+f(x+k) = ~ m 1 + f(k-x) 
~er2Ps ~ k~ - -f(k+x) 
where we have used the symmetry of f in the second equality. For the 
remainder of the proof assume that f'(t) exists for all t and the support 
of f is the entire real line. If either of these conditions fail to hold, 
the proof can be suitably modified. 
Since f has mlr we can write f(t) = exp[-g(t)] where g is convex, i.e, 
f is log concave. Now 
f(k-x) = exp{g(k+x) - g(k-x)} f(k+x) 
~ exp{2xg'(k-x)} 
(3. 3) 
by the convexity of g. Define 1- = 1-im g'(t), which must exist since g'(t) 
t~ 
is increasing. If 1-z~ the theorem is trivally true~ so assume that 1-<~. 
Substituting 1- for g'(k-x) in (3.3) gives a lower bound on the ratio 
f(k-x)/f(k+x), and it then follows that 
in£ P(H0 1x) 
11Ef2PS 
Next note that for t>O, the ratio 
f(t) ,tt-g(t) 
-1-t = e 
e 
is increasing in t, since 1- ~ g'(t). This implies that 
~ ~ f f( t)dt J e -1-tdt 
p(x) ,.. X ~ X = te-,tx 
~ ~ 
2/f(t)dt zf e-,ttdt 
0 0 
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by an application of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma together with a corollary 
relating power to size (Lehmann, 1959, Corollary 1, p. 67). 
Combining this inequality with that for inf P(H0 1x), it is straight-
forward to verify that 
proving the theorem. II 
1 
1 2'-x + e 
2: inf P(H0 1x) 
1rEf2PS 
For densities f whose support is the entire real line, it must be the 
case that "~0 so the inequality between inf P(H0 1x) and p(x) is strict. 
'1fEf2PS 
If f has bounded support then equality may be attained. 
Table 1 gives explicit expressions for some common distributions, the 
first three satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3.1. Note in particular 
that the values calculated for the double exponential distribution are 
quite similar to the bounds obtained in the above proof, suggesting that 
this distribution plays some role as a "boundary" distribution. The Cauchy 
distribution, which is symmetric but does not have mlr, does not attain its 
infimum at k=~ but rather at k = (x2 +1)t. The exponential distribution, 
which has mlr but is asymmetric, attains its infimum at k=x. For both of 
these distributions p(x) is greater than inf P(H0 1x). 
We now turn to the class of distributions fUS' all priors with 
symmetric unimodal densities. We can, in fact, demonstrate equality 
between p(x) and inf P(H0 1x) for this class. We will again use Lemma 3.1 
and the fact that rus is the set of all mixtures of 
U = {all symmetric uniform distributions} 
s 
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Iheorem 3.2: For the hypotheses in (2.1), if f is symmetric and has 
mlr 
the 
and 
and if x>O then 
inf 
'lrEfus 
Proof: The first 
second equality let 
P(H0 1x) "" inf P(H0 1x) "" p(x) 
weu 
s 
equality in (3.4) follows from 
'1(9) be uniform (-k,k). 
0 J f(x-9)d9 
-k P(H0 1x) • k J f(x-9)d9 
-k 
Then 
Lemma 3.1. 
"" (f(x-k)+f(x+k)) [ f(x+k) _ P(Hol x)] 
k f(x-k)+f(x+k) J f(x-9)d9 
-k 
(3.4) 
To prove 
(3. 5) 
We will now establish that P(H0 1x), as a function of k, has no minimum 
on the interior of (0,~). Suppose k•ko satisfies 
d 
dk P(Holx>jk k • o 
• 0 
It is straightforward to establish that the sign of the second derivative, 
evaluated at k•k0 , is given by 
( 3. 6) 
Since f is symmetric and has mlr, the ratio f(x+k)/f(x-k) is decreasing in 
k for fixed x>O. Therefore, the sign of (3.6) is always negative, so any 
interior extremum can only be a maximum. The minimum is obtained on the 
boundary, and it is straightforward to check from (3.5) that 
inf 
'JTe:U 
s 
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0 J f(x-e)de 0 
'-im ...;-~;;.._ __ = J f(x-9)de = p(x) 
k~ J f(x-e)de -CX) 
-k 
D 
In Theorem 3.2, as well as Theorem 3.3, the infimum equals the value 
of P(H0 jx) associated with the improper prior, Lebesgue measure on (-CX>,CX>). 
Indeed, the theorems are proved by considering a sequence of priors 
converging to this "uniform (-CX>,CX>)" prior. However, in other examples, 
such as the Cauchy and exponential examples following Theorem 3.4, the 
infimum is less than the value for this limiting uniform prior. 
Certain subclasses of rUS might also be of interest, for example, 
rNOR' the class of all normal priors with mean zero. Theorem 3.3 shows 
that any class, like rNOR' that consists of all scale transformations of a 
bounded, symmetric, and unimodal density will have inf P(H0 1x) • p(x) if f 
is symmetric with mlr. Furthermore, by using Lemma 3.1, this equality will 
hold for mixtures over these classes. For example, by considering scale 
mixtures of normal distributions in rNOR' we could obtain a class that 
included all t-distributions. 
Theorem 3.3: Let g(9) be any bounded, symmetric, and unimodal prior 
density, and consider the class 
ra(g) - {'IT : 'IT (e) = g(9/a)/a, a>O} 
a a 
(3.7) 
For the hypotheses in (2.1), iff is symmetric and has mlr and if x>O, then 
Proof: 
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a Since f (g) C rUS' by Theorem 3.2 
in& P(H0 1x) ~ p(x) 
~ er (g) 
a 
To establish the opposite inequality, write 
in& P(H0 1x) ~ ~im P~ (H0 1x) 
~aer (g) a~ a 
0 J f(x-9)g(8/a)da 
-~ 
= ~im ----------------~ 
a~ J f(x-9)g(9/a)da 
-~ 
(3.8) 
The boundedness of g allows us to apply the dominated convergence theorem 
to bring the limit inside the integral. Furthermore, since g is symmetric 
and unimodal, ~im g(9/a) = g0 (say) exists and is positive. Thus 
a~ 
= p(x) 
establishing that in& P(H0 1x) ~ p(x) which together with (3.8) proves the 
~ er (g) 
theorem. o a 
The conditions on g and f may be relaxed and a similar theorem can be 
proved. Since the proof of Theorem 3.4 is similar to that of Theorem 3.3 
we omit it. 
Theorem 3.4: Let f be any density on II , and let g be any prior that 
is bounded and left- and right-continuous at zero. Denote ~im g(9) • g(O-) 
+ a ato 
and ~im g(9) = g(O ), and define the class r (g) as in (3.7). Then for the 
e~o _ + 
hypotheses in (2.1), if xis such that max{g(O )p(x),g(O )[1-p(x)]} > 0, 
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(3.9) 
Note in particular that, in Theorem 3.4, if g(O+) m g(O-) then the 
right-most expression in (3.9) is p(x) showing that, for any location 
sampling density, the infimum over such classes of scale transformations is 
bounded above by the p-value. If f is not symmetric or does not have mlr, 
then strict inequality may obtain in (3.9). We will mention two examples. 
For both, Theorem 3.4 implies inf P(H0 !x) ~ p(x) but, in fact, the in-
equality is strict. For each example we let g be the Uniform(-1,1) density 
a 
so that r (g) = US. Let ~k E US denote the Uniform(-k,k) density. 
Let f be a Cauchy density, which is symmetric but does not have mlr. 
For ~k it is straightforward to calculate 
-1 -1 
P (Holx) • tan (x+k)-tan (x) 
~k tan-1(x+k)-tan-1(x-k) 
For fixed x>O, P (H0 !x) is not monotone in k, but rather attains a unique 
nk 
minimum at a finite value of k. Table 2 lists the minimizing values of k, 
inf P(H0 !x), and the p-value for selected values of x. Examination of 
Table 2 shows that inf P(H0 1x) < p(x); this observation held true for more 
extensive calculations that are not reported here. 
For our second example, let f be an exponential location density, 
which has mlr but is asymmetric. For x>O and nk e US we have 
P (H0 !x) • [exp(k)-1]/{exp[k+min(k,x)]-1} ~k 
which is minimized (in k) at k=x, with minimum 
x 2x -x inf P(H0 1x) = (e -1)/(e -1) < e = p(x) 
So again, strict inequality obtains in (3.9). 
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In fact, for small values of x, the p-value can be regarded as a 
conservative Bayesian measure in this example. It is straightforward to 
calculate 
-x 
sup P(H0 1x) = max{t,e } = max{t,p(x)} 
so, in particular, if x ~ log 2 then p(x) is larger than P(H0 1x) for every 
prior in the class. 
Finally, we turn to the class fA' which contains all distributions 
giving mass t to each of H0 and H1 , and might be considered the broadest 
class of impartial priors. However, this class is really too broad to be 
of any practical interest since, for any density f, inf P(H0 1x) • 0. To ver-
~~rA 
ify this, let g be any bounded density in fA with g(O ) = 0 and g(O+) > 0. 
Then if p(x) < 1, Theorem 3.4 shows that inf P(H0 1x) = in& P(H0 1x) • 0. 
~erA ~er (g) 
However, the restriction that the priors give equal probability to H 0 
and H1 has little weight in the above argument. A prior g could assign 
probability arbitrarily near one to H0 and still we would have inf P(H0 1x) 
- + r~(g) 
= 0 if g(O ) • 0 and g(O ) > 0. It is important to note that, for any class 
of priors r possessing densities, if the class is closed under scale trans-
formations then Theorem 3.4 gives an upper bound on inf P(H0 1x) which depends 
only on the local behavior of g, the density of any element of r, at 0. 
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4. COMKEIITS 
For the problem of testing a one-sided hypothesis in a location 
parameter family, it is possible to reconcile measures of evidence between 
the Bayesian and frequentist approaches. The phrase, "the probability that 
Ho is true," has no meaning within frequency theory, but it has been argued 
that practitioners sometimes attach such a meaning to the p-value. Since 
the p-value, in the cases considered, is an upper bound on the infimum of 
P(H0 1x) it lies within or at the boundary of a range of Bayesian measures 
of evidence demonstrating the extent to which the Bayesian terminology can 
be attached. In particular, for the Cauchy (non-mlr) and exponential 
(asymmetric) sampling densities we found that, for various classes of 
priors, inf P(H0 1x) < p(x) so that p(x) is, in fact, equal to P(H0 1x) for 
some prior in the class (the prior depending on x). 
The discrepancies observed by Berger and Sellke in the two-sided 
(point null) case do not carry over to the problems considered here. This 
leads to the question of determining what factors are crucial in differen-
tiating the two problems. It seems that if some prior mass is concentrated 
at a point (or in a small interval) and the remainder is allowed to vary 
over HI' then discrepancies between Bayesian and frequentist measures will 
obtain. In fact, Berger and Sellke note that for testing H0 : 9•0 vs. 
HI: 9>0, the p-value and the Bayesian infimum are quite different. (For 
example, for X~ n(9,1), an observed x • 1.645 will give a p-value of .OS, 
while over all priors for which mass t is concentrated at zero, inf 
P(H0 1x=I.645) • .21.) 
Seen in another light, however, placing a point mass of t at H0 may 
not be representative of an impartial prior distribution. For the problem 
of testing H0 : 9SO vs. H1 : 9>0, consider priors of the form 
(4.1) 
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where ~O is a fixed number, and h(9) and g(a) are proper prior densities on 
(-~,0] and (0,~), respectively. It then follows that, iff is unimodal 
with mode 0 and x>O, 
0 
~0 f f(x-9)h(9)d9 
sup P(H0 1x) • sup 
h h 
-~ 
0 ~ 
~oJ f(x-9)h(9)d9+(1-~0 >/ f(x-9)g(9)de 
-~ . 0 
~ 
~0f(x)+(l-~0>/ f(x-a)g(9)d9 
0 
(4.2) 
and the last expression is equal to P(H0 1x) for the hypotheses H0 : 9•0 vs. 
H1 : 9>0 with prior giving mass ~O to 9=0 and having density (l-~0 )g(9) if 
9>0. Thus, concentrating mass on the point null hypothesis is biasing the 
prior in favor of H0 as much as possible (for fixed g) in this one-sided 
testing problem. 
The calculation in (4.2) casts doubt on the reasonableness of regard-
ing ~0=t as impartial. In fact, it is not clear to us if any prior that 
concentrates mass at a point can be viewed as an impartial prior. There-
fore, it is not surprising that the p-value and Bayesian evidence differ in 
the normal example given above. Setting ~0 -t actually reflects a bias 
toward H0 , which is reflected in the Bayesian measure of evidence. 
Indeed, any class of priors which fixes the probability distribution 
on one hypothesis and allows the probability distribution on the other 
hypothesis to vary might lead to extreme posterior probabilities. For 
example, consider prior densities of the form 
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where h and g are as above. Then under conditions similar to those of 
Theorem 3.3, if a 1 is fixed, 
but if a2 is fixed then 
Clearly, there are classes of priors for which there are large discrep-
ancies between inf P(H0 1x) and p(x); however, the fact remains that 
reconciliation of measures of evidence is possible between the Bayesian and 
frequentist approaches. Since these measures can overlap one another, 
interpretations of one school of thought can have meaning within the other 
and, contrary to the message of Berger and Sellke, p-values may not always 
overstate evidence against H0 in that P(H0 1x) < p(x) for some priors under 
consideration. 
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Table 1. P-Values and inf P(H0 1x) for the Classes of 
S,..atric Two-Point Distributions and All 
Syaaetric Distributions (x>O) 
Distribution p(x) inf P(H0 I x) 
Normal 1 - t(x) 0 
Double exponential te-x (l+e2x) -1 
Logistic (1 + ex)-1 (l+e2x) -1 
tan -1 l+(x-(xZ +q t p Cauchy t - X 1f 2+[x-(x2 +l)t] 2 +[x+(x2+1)t]z 
Exponential -x (l+e2x)-1 e 
-20-
Table 2. P-Values and inf P(H0 1x) for X ~ Cauchy, 
Infiaat Over U 
s 
X k 
min p(x) inf P(H0 I x) 
.2 2.363 .437 .429 
.4 2.444 .379 .363 
.6 2.570 .328 • 306 
.8 2.727 .285 .260 
1.0 2.913 .250 .222 
1.2 3.112 .221 .192 
1.4 3.323 .197 .168 
1.6 3.541 .178 .148 
1.8 3.768 .161 .132 
2.0 3.994 .148 .119 
2.5 4.572 .121 .094 
3.0 5.158 .102 .077 
3.5 5. 746 .089 .065 
4.0 6.326 .078 .056 
5.0 7.492 .063 .044 
10.0 13.175 .032 .020 
25.0 29.610 .013 .007 
50.0 56.260 .006 .004 
75.0 82.429 .004 .002 
100.0 108.599 .003 .002 
